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Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO 
Proposal 
Lan Cao 
For thousands of years, it has been regulated, reviled, and criminalized, 
yet it remains a deeply entrenched and pervasive institution in our society. 
Despite its ubiquitous presence, prostitution and the problems associated 
with it-the violence, abuse, and degradation of women-remain invisible 
to and low priorities for the nation's law enforcement agencies. Invisibil-
ity, paradoxically, is even more pronounced in cases of forced prostitu-
tion.1 This Note first examines the nature of forced prostitution and the 
1. This Note only deals with forced prostitution and does not address cases where women volunta-
rily work as prostitutes. Women who choose prostitution as a mode of employment will simply not 
exercise the option of instituting civil suits described in this Note. This Note considers forced prostitu-
tion in accordance with the definition proposed by Kathleen Barry: Forced prostitution or "(f]emale 
sexual slavery is present in all situations where women or girls cannot change the immediate condi-
tions of their existence; where regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out; and 
where they are subject to sexual violence and exploitation." K. BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY 33 
(1979). This Note thus focuses on external conditions, such as the organization of business, modes of 
recruitment, and trafficking patterns, rather than on internal, psychological motivations of women in 
prostitution. /d. at 7. The inquiries are shifted away from the victim's innocence or purity, whether 
she is a "madonna" or "whore," and whether or not she initially entered into prostitution voluntarily. 
/d. at 10. "The issue is not whether a child, teenager, or adult woman is a poor, innocent, sweet 
young thing." /d. Despite the enormity of the problem, reluctance to acknowledge its presence contin-
ues. R. RosEN, THE LoST SISTERHOOD 112-16 (1982). When the subject is confronted, its treatment 
borders on sensationalism, K. BARRY, supra, at 10, and its coverage is riddled with dramatization of 
lurid details of young girls trapped by evil men, R. RoSEN, supra, at 114-15. The image of a victim-
ized white girl is created and captured by the popularly coined phrase "white slave." K. BARRY, 
supra, at 27. The White-Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act), ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)) was passed, in the words of its sponsor, Representative 
Mann, to assist "those women and girls who, if given a fair chance, would, in all human probability, 
have been good wives and mothers." C. BARNES, THE WHITE SLAVE ACT, (1946), submitted in 
Petitioner's Brief at 27, Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 47, 
61st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909)). The concept of "white slavery" reflects the tenor of the late nine-
teenth to early twentieth century purity crusade, which focused on "the immoral destruction of inno-
cent girls' virtue and sinful incontinence in men." K. BARRY, supra, at 26. White, middle class 
women were the embodiments of innocence and purity. See R. RosEN, supra, at 49, 62. By contrast, 
this Note is concerned not with issues of morality but with issues of power and sexual exploitation. 
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illegal traffic in women for this purpose. It then describes how a private 
right of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RIC0)2 can enable women in prostitution to fight the problems that 
the government can or will not. 
I. NATURE OF PROBLEM 
Forced prostitution today is a highly organized,3 clandestine, and im-
mensely profitable4 business in which women are controlled by organized 
enterprises and pimps who profit from their sexual labors.11 Indeed, the 
problem has become so large and organized that the United Nations 
(U.N.) has ranked it with other major human rights violations in the 
world. U.N. bodies are called on "'to review developments in the field of 
slavery and the slave trade in all their practices and manifestations, in-
cluding the slavery-like practices of apartheid and colonialism, the traffic 
in persons and the exploitation of the prostitution of others.' "6 
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). RICO was enacted as Title IX of the 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48. 
3. See K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 55, 82; R. RosEN, supra note 1, at xii, 37; G. SHEEHY, 
HUSTLING 13-14, 121-23 (1973); see also infra note 6 and accompanying text. 
4. SeeR. Ros~:N, supra note 1, at 71-72; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 4 (estimated 7 to 9 billion 
dollars annually); Kaplan & Kessler, The Economics of Prostitution, in AN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
CRIME 327-28 (L. Kaplan & D. Kessler eds. 1976) (gross revenues in massage parlors estimated at 
$2000 to $3000 daily by New York City Police Department vice squad members); see also Plea by 
Girl, 15, Sparks Raid on Sex Studio, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 28, 1972, at 10-A, col. 1 [hereinafter 
Detroit Free Press) ($17,000 confiscated from Times Square massage parlor, estimated by police to be 
no more than "a week's take"). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. Clemones, 577 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1978) (women 
bought and sold by pimps), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). 
Prostitution remains an enormously profitable business, with most of the profits siphoned off 
by men-pimps, taxidrivers, members of organized crime, liquor dealers, physicians, and real 
estate speculators .... [I)t is nearly impossible for a woman to ply her trade independently on 
the street for fear of trespassing on some pimp's territory. 
R. RosEN, supra note 1, at 171-72. G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 5-7 (average net income is less than 
$100 per week for streetwalker; pimps demand $200 to S250 per night from their girls, but girls 
themselves keep no more than five percent), 105 (one woman interviewed turned over all money to 
her pimp); Jennings, The Victim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution Law, 64 
CALIF. L. REV. 1235, 1246 n.62 {1976) {control of prostitutes by pimps); Kaplan & Kessler, supra 
note 4, at 328; cj. NATIONAL PROSTITUTION COMM., NATIONAL 0RG. FOR WOMEN, WORKING ON 
PROSTITUTION 8-9 (n.d.) [hereinafter PROSTITUTION CoMMITTEE) (psychological reasons why pros-
titutes have pimps); Jennings, supra, at 1246-47 (prostitutes, especially streetwalkers, rely on pimps 
for protection). 
6. Updating of the Report on Slavery Submitted to the Sub-commission in 1966, U.N. ESCOR 
Commission on Human Rights, (35th sess.) (Agenda Item 14) at para. 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 
Sub.Z/1982/20/Add.l (1982) (emphasis added). For more information on international treatment of 
the trafficking business, see id. at para. 72(xv)-(xvii); Exploitation of Labour Through Illicit and 
Clandestine Trafficking, U.N. ESCOR Commission on the Status of Women (25th sess.) (Agenda 
Item 9) at paras. 32, 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/582 (1973) (hereinafter Exploitation of Labour). In his 
official report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Jean Fernand-Laurent, wrote: "[W)e ... consider 
prostitution to be a form of slavery." Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Suppression of The 
Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, U.N. ESCOR, (1st reg. sess.) 
(Agenda Item 12), U.N. Doc. E/1983/7 {1983) [hereinafter Fernand-Laurent), reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL FEMINISM: NJ;.'TWORKING AGAINST FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY app. 6 at 131 (K. Barry, 
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A. How Women Are Procured 
To run and furnish the sex slave business, women are recruited by or-
ganized rings of procurers, using fraudulent recruiting methods.7 For ex-
ample, they are abducted,8 procured through organized crime, recruited 
by phony employment agencies, and trafficked into the U.S. via false mar-
riage contracts. 
The migrant labor system is particularly susceptible to abuse because 
migrant workers are organized under the strict supervision of crew lead-
ers, who often seek to control the workers and keep them in debt by in-
ducing them to spend their money on liquor and prostitution.9 Women, 
many of whom are retarded or emotionally disturbed, and recently re-
leased from mental institutions, are recruited for work by these crew lead-
ers; once they arrive, however, they are "forced to serve as labor camp 
prostitutes in return for food.mo Other women serve the migrant camps 
after having been released from prison and sold to the crew leaders by 
jailers for a small sum of money.11 
Bogus employment agencies and artistic tours provide another common 
C. Bunch & S. Castley eds. 1984) (hereinafter INTERNATIONAL FEMINISM). Traffic in women and 
forced prostitution are internationally recognized as organized criminal activity. The enormous scope 
of trafficking has Jed the United Nations to recommend that all appropriate international organiza-
tions-the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization, the 
International Labor Organization, the U.N. Children's Fund, the U.N. Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, the World Tourism Organization, Interpol, and other non-governmental agen-
cies-be coordinated to address the problem. E.S.C. Res. 1982/20, U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 
15, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982). 
7. Exploitation of Labour, supra note 6, para. 6 (U.N. Commission on Status of Women address-
ing problem of "young girls and women who were lured into Jives of prostitution by false promises of 
overseas jobs"), para. 32 (women who are "recruited under the cover of seemingly normal contracts 
for prostitutional or pre-prostitutional activities . . . may find themselves in an illegal situation in-
volving practices similar to slavery or a form of forced labour"); Interpol Report, Report by the Gen-
eral Secretariat of Interpol, U.N. Division of Human Rights (1974), reprinted inK. BARRY, supra 
note I, app. A, at 238 (modes of recruitment); S. BARLAY, SEX SLAVERY 61-74, 78-90 (rev. ed. 1975) 
(fraudulent theatrical touring troupes); K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 90; R. RoSEN, supra note 1, at 
125-26 (false promises of marriage; fraudulent employment agencies; offers of assistance to teenage 
runaways). 
8. See United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1463-64 {11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. 879 (1986) (women bought and sold by motorcycle gang operating prostitution enterprise); 
United States v. Hattaway, 740 F.2d 1419, 1422, 1427 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1028 {1984) 
{women abducted and held by motorcycle gang for prostitution); United States v. Bankston, 603 F.2d 
528, 530 (5th Cir. 1979) {women abducted at gunpoint and told to engage in prostitution); United 
States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1068 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 {1978) (same); 
see also A Shocking Glimpse at Cycle Gang Life, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 12, 1979, at 11, col. 4 
(hitchhikers beaten and forced to prostitute themselves). 
9. See, e.g., Schwartz, The Plight of America's Five Million Migrants, Ms., June 1978, at 65, 66. 
10. I d. Sociologist Richard Morrison, coordinator of a migrant service agency, described finding a 
retarded black woman who had been transported from Florida to Virginia to serve as a prostitute for 
a crew of a hundred and fifty men. See also United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 603-04 (9th Cir. 
1984) (prostitution at migrant labor camps); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d at 1069-70 (prosti-
tution ring controlled by defendants catered to "high-volume, low-overhead business" generated by 
migrant workers). 
11. Schwartz, supra note 9, at 66-67. 
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method of recruitment.12 Women are promised legitimate show-business 
jobs by recruiters who tell them upon arrival that the original job is no 
longer available and that the only jobs open are those for stripteasers and 
exotic dancers.13 These women, many of whom are brought into U.S. cit-
ies from Canada/4 are required to socialize, mix drinks with customers,IG 
and are then forced into prostitution.16 
One Japanese syndicate, for example, uses this strategy to lure Ameri-
can women into Japan for prostitution. The women are recruited through 
seemingly legitimate show-business advertisements placed in American 
newspapers by West Coast talent agencies.17 Before departure, the recruit 
is given a contract specifying salary, place and time of performance, and a 
pre-paid plane ticket. Upon arrival, however, she is met by a different 
agent and informed that her contract has been bought by him. Her papers 
are seized, and she is intimidated and forced into working as a 
prostitute.18 
Besides employment frauds, women are also procured through marriage 
frauds.19 Many Korean women who work in massage parlors throughout 
12. See American Guild of Variety Artists: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investi-
gations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 134 (1962) [hereinaf-
ter AGVA Hearings] (statement of William J. Scott, former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, North-
ern District of Illinois) (girls from rural areas of U.S. and Canada promised starring roles in show 
business and eventually forced into prostitution at exotic nightclubs); id. at 278-79 (statement of Glen 
F. Rice, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investigator) (Canadian girls recruited by 
AGVA agent for legitimate dancing jobs but sent instead to nude dancing clubs, where they were 
"held in literal bondage by the club operator" and guarded by bodyguard); see also S. BARLAY, supra 
note 7, at 1-17, 50-60 (fraudulent employment agencies advertising for jobs overseas); K. BARRY, 
supra note 1, at 90 (general discussion of fraudulent employment agencies); Women-The Suppres-
sion of Traffic in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others-A Report by Fernand-
Laurent, at 2 (Radio U.N. broadcast, No. 186) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Radio 
U.N.] ("girls . . . lured into leaving their country to take part in tournee of dancing and singing in 
cabarets that ends up in brothels"). 
13. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134 (statement of William J. Scott), 137-38 (same), 
276-80 (statement of Glen Rice). 
14. Id. at 282 (statement of Mario T. Nato, Associate Commissioner, INS, Washington, D.C.), 
318 (statement of E. Thomas Maxwell, Jr., former Assistant State Attorney, Baltimore City). 
15. Id. at 148-49 (woman required to solicit drinks from customers in violation of AGVA union 
contract), 261 (statement of Martin Cavanaugh, branch manager of Chicago office of AGVA) (clause 
in union contract requiring club owners to comply with laws which prohibit mixing drinks with 
customers and prostitution not enforced by union), 327 (statement of E. Thomas Maxwell, Jr.) ("so-
licitation of drinks ... and prostitution" a prerequisite to keeping job). Although aware of the condi-
tions in the clubs, the union did nothing. Id. at 221-23 (statement of Sergeant Louis Cantone, Intelli-
gence Division, Chicago Police Department). 
16. Id. at 134 (statement of William J. Scott), 153 (statement of AGVA dancer) (backrooms in 
clubs for prostitution), 159-60 (same), 171-72 (statement of Casimir E. Linkiewicz, chief of police of 
Calumet City, Illinois). 
17. Oppenheim, japanese Mafia's Recruiting of American Women Probed, Chicago Trib., Mar. 
14, 1982, § 1, at 6. 
18. Id. 
19. 20/20: GI Brides (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 6, 1983) [hereinafter 20 120) (transcript on 
file with author). 
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the U.S. are brought into this country by Gis paid to marry them.2° Fake 
marriage brokers set up connections with visa fraud businesses in Korea. 
To expedite the process, these brokers collude with U.S. Embassy employ-
ees to manufacture false documents needed to obtain U.S. visas.21 This 
fraud in Korea is in turn connected to organized prostitution rings in the 
U.S.22 Both work together in the business of "importing prostitutes as sex 
slaves," who are employed in saunas and bars that act as fronts for 
prostitution. 23 
The mail-order-bride business is another method used to bring women 
into the U.S. While most are legitimate businesses set up to offer Ameri-
can men correspondence and marriage to foreign women,24 many agencies 
are fraudulent organizations used as prostitution fronts. 25 
B. Organized Prostitution 
In all of these schemes, the procurers are not loose and disjointed groups 
sporadically engaged in pimping activities. On the contrary, they are or-
ganized networks structured to procure, transport, and retain women in 
20. /d. at 3. Telephone interview with Detective Fred Clapp, Los Angeles Police Department, 
Administrative Vice Division (Oct. 3, 1986) [hereinafter Clapp Interview) ("It happens a lot with 
servicemen. The marriage broker over there [Korea) makes the deal. And the massage parlor owners 
here buy these people, usually for a time period, from those people over there that arranged the 
marriage."). Police observations of Korean massage parlors in the Queens area of New York City 
suggest that the military is being used to bring in the women, although conclusive evidence is hard to 
obtain. Interview with Thomas Russo, Executive Assistant District Attorney of Queens County, N.Y. 
(Oct. 17, 1986) [hereinafter Russo Interview]. 
21. The false documents include divorce certificates, false bank statements, and notary public 
seals. 20120, supra note 19, at 4. 
22. /d. at 3. 
23. /d. at 2. Korean women are not the only ones brought into the U.S. for prostitution. 
Taiwanese women have also been used. See, e.g., United States v. I Huei Chin, No. S. 86. Cr. 393 
(RWS) (S.D.N.Y., filed May 8, 1986); Family Charged with Operating Taiwan Prostitution Ring, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1986, § 1, at 31, col. 2. 
24. See Agus, The Brides-To-Order Business, Newsday, Mar. 8, 1984, § 2, at 4 (discussion of 
abusive conditions encountered by mail-order brides, even when agencies are legitimate); Joseph, 
American Men Find Asian Brides Fill the Unliberated Bill, Wall St.]., Jan. 25, 1984, at 1, col. 4 
(same). 
25. Belkin, The Mail-Order Marriage Business, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 
28. "Not all mail-order marriage agencies are reputable. The post office box number listed for an 
agency one day may be closed the next, and the business that advertises itself as a marriage broker 
may in fact be promoting pornography or prostitution." /d. According to Verne Jervis, a spokesperson 
for the INS, "(i)t is a situation that is rife with the potential for fraud .•.. " Id. at 52. Authorities in 
the Philippines are "concerned that women are being gulled by phoney introduction agencies that 
promise them they will get a foreign husband and instead ship them overseas to work as bar girls or 
prostitutes." The Asian Bride Boom, Asiaweek, Apr. 15, 1983, at 36, 43. In 1982, 4,491 Filipinos 
entered the U.S. as spouses of Americans, more than twice the combined total from India, Japan, 
Taiwan, and the Republic of China. In addition, 1,763 more Filipinos entered the U.S. on fiance 
visas, more than the combined total from Japan, China, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. 
It is not known how many are mail-order brides. Agus, supra note 24, at 4-5. The Philippines has 
been cited by Interpol as being part of an "East Asian market" to recruit women and send them to 
other countries. K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 50 (referring to report by General Secretariat of Interna-
tional Police Organization submitted to U.N.). 
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prostitution. 26 Once procured, the women are psychologically conditioned, 
physically and mentally intimidated,27 and if needed, trafficked through 
established transportation networks. 28 
These networks also have sound financial bases29 and work largely 
through organizations that also conduct legitimate business. In fact, the 
modern strip joint, which often is a front for prostitution, "affects to be a 
phase of legitimate show business .... [A]lthough racketeer controlled, 
[the joint] operates with an air of legitimacy with the use of fronts. They 
have contracts with the American Guild of Variety Artists and employ 
girls who are members of the organization."30 
26. See generally supra text accompanying notes 12-25. Investigators into Korean massage parlor 
operations believe that "there is a nationwide network involved, going all the way back to Korea." 
Russo Interview, supra note 20; see also G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 123 (police found every New 
York city midtown massage parlor, except four, run by same overlord and all had ties to one criminal 
organization). For testimony on the organized nature of criminal involvement in striptease clubs, see 
AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134, 139, 142, 175, 208, 315-16; 20120, supra note 19, at 5 
(statement of Sergeant Fred Palmer, sheriff department, Pierce County, Tacoma, Washington). 
27. United States v. Winters, 729 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1984} (experts testifying on post-
traumatic stress disorder and psychological conditioning process undergone by victims of forced prosti-
tution); K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 78-82 (psychological conditioning process and courting tech-
niques known as "seasoning" used by pimps to wear down victim and make her psychologically, 
emotionally, and financially dependent); Fernand-Laurent, supra note 6, reprinted in INTERNA-
TIONAL F~:MINISM, supra note 6, at 131 (women "subjected by the procurer to a very effective disci-
pline . . . undergo a psychological conditioning such as may be experienced by someone living in 
community within a sect."}; see also AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 134 (women threatened with 
their own and children's lives), 159-60 (girls beaten by customers). 
28. See AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 139 (statement of William J. Scott, former Special 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois) (women moved to different cities to avoid ar-
rest}. One case involved the transportation of twenty-eight women found suffocated in sealed contain-
ers used to traffic them from St. Martin to St. Thomas in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The metal contain-
ers had no breathing holes, and the women died of suffocation during the two day journey. 28 Women 
Said To Die in Cargo Box, Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 21, 1985, at llA, col. 6. 
29. See supra note 4. While prostitution house operators and owners clearly profit from their 
operations, as do pimps, supra note 5, a score of other financial interests are involved as well. Many 
prominent business people, including property owners and landlords of prostitution hotels, massage 
parlors, and topless bars, profit enormously from the sex industry. G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 
12-13, 118-19, 129-30. Lawyers, too, have been involved both as owners of property housing high-
rent tenants in prostitution-related businesses, and as fronts, allowing the massage parlors' incorpora-
tion papers to carry their names rather than the names of the actual owners. /d. at 120-27; see also 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL jUSTICE STANDARDS AND GoALS, REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME 225 (1976) (hereinafter 1976 TASK FORCE) ("Attorneys' names 
appear on [massage parlor) licenses to hide the identity of actual owners. Many of the members of 
organized crime who own these facilities are extensively involved in other real estate."); R. RosEN, 
supra note 1, at 71-77 (profiteers of prostitution in early 1900's included wide array of interest 
groups, including politicians, police, hotel and saloon owners, and pimps). "It's really an exploitation 
issue. While the girls are making some money, the real money is made by the real estate people, the 
owners, and the people involved in the trafficking business." Russo Interview, supra note 20. Sheehy 
points to the broader context: "The prostitutes continue to take all the arrests, the police to suffer 
frustration, the lawyers to mine gold, the operators to laugh, the landowners to insist they have no 
responsibility, the mayor to issue press releases. The nature of the beast is, in a word, greed." G. 
SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 153-54. 
30. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 377 (statement of Daniel Sullivan, operating director of 
Crime Commission of Greater Miami). In fact, in many cases, the women working in these striptease 
clubs had been promised "stardom in the entertainment field," id. at 278 (statement of Glen Rice, 
INS investigator), and had been recruited by AGVA-franchised booking agencies licensed by AGVA 
1302 
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To avoid detection, the organizations are tightly structured and method-
ically run. Force and threats are often used to intimidate the women to 
keep them from leaving or going to the police. 31 In addition, precaution-
ary measures are used to insulate the recruiters from prosecution. 32 Con-
tact names used in ads for singers change frequently; old offices are va-
cated and new ones opened at different locations. 33 The networks provide 
the women with a number of aliases and move them to different cities to 
work in different prostitution houses. 34 Prosecution is made much more 
difficult by the elaborate methods used to evade detection. 
to solicit new members. See also supra note 15. 
Congress found that "organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and 
widespread activity .... [Its) money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legiti-
mate business and labor unions .... "Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 
84 Stat. 922, at 922-23. It is also "an elusive, changing, nationwide activity involving criminal, quasi-
criminal, and deceptively legitimate individuals." 1976 TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 21. Organized 
prostitution is part of this general phenomenon. The Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, after 
holding hearings and listening to witness testimony, concluded that: 
a) These clubs ... are controlled by criminal organizations of gangsters and hoodlums 
operating through fronts so that they can get the necessary liquor and other licenses. 
c) Illegal activities, such as the solicitation of alcoholic drinks from patrons, and even prosti-
tution, exist in these places to the extent that in many cases they are obviously the rule rather 
than the exception. A legitimate female entertainer who will not abide by the "house rules," 
however vicious and degrading they may be, cannot work. 
d) The AGV A members employed in these clubs are under complete domination and control 
of hoodlum owners. 
AGVA Htarings, supra note 12, at 630 (remarks of Sen. McClellan, chairperson, who later became 
principal sponsor of RICO). For more documentation of infiltration by organized crime into busi-
nesses and the use of businesses such as massage parlors as fronts for prostitution, see 197 6 TASK 
FoRCE, supra note 29, at 12, 14, 16, 225. Consistent with underworld use of threats and intimidation, 
a massage parlor in Times Square, New York City, was found to have used recording equipment, 
probably to tape customers for extortion purposes. Detroit Free Press, supra note 4. . 
31. For specific examples, see AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 138 (statement of William J. 
Scott, former Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois), 182 (statement of Casi-
mir Linkiewicz, former police chief, Calumet City, Illinois), 213-16 (statement of Sgt. Louis Cantone, 
Intelligence Division, Chicago Police Department), 281 (statement of Glen Rice, INS Investigator), 
31 5-16 (statement of Thomas Maxwell, former Assistant State Attorney for Baltimore City). 
32. Recruiters often claim they never intended to expose the women they recruited to prostitution 
situations. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 137-38 (statement of William J. Scott). The Los 
Angeles Police Department could not make any arrests despite extensive investigation: "We could not 
prove the recruiters in the U.S. intended for the women to be in the situation they found themselves in 
in Japan. We couldn't tie them into any conspiracy. And since the crime occurred outside of our 
jurisdiction, we could not make any arrest." Clapp Interview, supra note 20. The U.N. recognizes the 
difficulty of proving intent in such cases and has recommended focusing instead on results of the 
recruiters' action, rather than on their intent. Exploitation of Labour, supra note 6, para. 29. 
RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), lists certain acts prohibited under state and federal law, including the 
federal statute outlawing the interstate transportation of women for prostitution (Mann Act), 18 
U.S.C. § 2421 (1982). Although courts interpreting the Mann Act require that an intent to prostitute 
a woman be a "dominant motive" for transporting her interstate, Mortensen v. United States, 322 
U.S. 369, 374 (1944), United States v. Lomas, 440 F.2d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1971) (prostitution to be 
"one of the dominant purposes" of trip), the burden of proving this requirement can be more easily 
met by a private plaintiff under civil RICO than under a criminal action by prosecutors. See infra 
note 68. 
33. Horton & Coli, Whitt Slaves, PLAYGIRL, Nov. 1982, at 48, 103. 
34. 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (statement by Geraldo Rivera, correspondent). According to one 
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Nationwide networks of organized prostitution rings also traffic in chil-
dren. " 'A group of pimps set up connections in Houston, Los Angeles, 
San Francisco, New Orleans, New York and Washington, D.C.' .... 
'You could call a number in Houston from Washington and have a young 
boy brought to your room in Washington.' " 311 
C. Ineffectiveness of Official Response 
Despite the enormity of the problem, or perhaps because of it, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies have made little headway in breaking up the procur-
ing rings. A police officer commenting on his investigation in the traffic of 
women to Japan says: "After seven years [on the case] I'm frustrated. I 
can't do anything to stop it, the feds can't do anything, and the State 
Department doesn't want to do anything."36 All too often, those in the 
position to do something about the problem either ignore or belittle it. For 
example, although State Department and Immigration Service officials es-
timate that at least one GI a day is involved in a false marriage,37 top 
Army brass deems this illicit traffic mere rumor: "There's always a cer-
tain rumor . . . that there are large numbers, but . . . from the military 
standpoint, I don't see that.''38 There is sentiment in the Army that it is 
improper to evaluate a GI's motive for marriage.39 
Some enforcement officials in the U.S. are also susceptible to bribery: 
"[The city councils and police] let [prostitution fronts] operate. Their 
profits are so fabulous that they are able to place such great temptation in 
prosecutor, women working at massage parlors in Queens, a New York City borough, are periodically 
transported to other massage parlors nationwide. Russo Interview, supra note 20. 
35. Call-Boy Rings Said To Aid Spies, Newsday, July 27, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (Detective Anne 
Fisher of Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department testifying at hearings called by New 
York State Senator Ralph Marino). Runaway girls also provide easy targets for pimps in the New 
York City Times Square area, K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 82-83; many come from Minneapolis, a 
phenomenon now known as the "Minneapolis pipeline," id.; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 100-02 
(same). Juvenile prostitutes number approximately 500,000 in the United States. PROSTITUTION 
CoMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11. It is estimated that 600,000 to 1,000,000 children, aged nine to 
seventeen, run away from home each year, and that a large percentage of them become prostitutes. R. 
ToNG, WoMEN, SEx, AND THE LAW 60 (1984). According to Los Angeles District Attorney John 
Van de Kamp, children have been sold into child prostitution rings for up to SlOOO. 9 Indicted in a 
Child Sex Ring, San Francisco Chron., Aug. I, 1978, at 2, col. 5; see also Detroit Free Press, supra 
note 4 (report by fifteen year old runaway forced into prostitution led to raid on Times Square 
massage parlor). 
36. Horton & Coli, supra note 33, at 108 (statement of Detective Fred Clapp, Los Angeles Police 
Department). 
37. 20120, supra note 19, at 5; see also Shaughnessy, Fighting Sexual Exploitation of Women, 
NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, Nov. 1983, at 26, 26 (published by United Methodist Church, Education 
and Cultivation Division) (Los Angeles police and FBI documented at least 300 to 500 cases a year of 
women lured by "talent agencies" for entertainment jobs in Japan). 
38. 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (statement of Col. John Thornock, judge advocate general of 
Eighth Army in Seoul, South Korea). 
39. Id. 
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front of law enforcement officers that the first thing you know human 
frailties prevail and your whole enforcement mechanism breaks down. "40 
Paradoxically, when officials do respond to prostitution, they usually 
reinforce the women's helplessness, because current prostitution penal 
codes are aimed against the prostitutesY Of those arrested in 1979 on 
prostitution charges, 70% were female prostitutes and 20% were male 
prostitutes; only 10% were customers.42 The law thus victimizes prosti-
40. AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 384 {statement of Sen. Mundt); see also United States v. 
Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1982) {operators of prostitution business bribed Justice of 
the Peace and constable); United States v. Lee Stoller Enters., 652 F.2d 1313, 1314-15 {7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 {1981) {sheriff took kickbacks from houses of prostitution); United States 
v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 525-26 {4th Cir. 1980) (local prosecutor offered protection to prostitu-
tion ring in exchange for cash and sexual services); 20120, supra note 19, at 5 (report by correspon-
dent Geraldo Rivera) (money from S10 million per year massage parlor industry in Tacoma, Wash-
ington, used to bribe local officials). For a general discussion of the connection between political office 
and organized crime, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE ATroRNEY G~:NERAI.-THE lMPACf: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 28-30 (1986) (hereinaf-
ter 1986 REPORT); 1976 TASK FoRcE, supra note 29, at 23-33; C. MoLLENHOFF, STRIKE FoRCE 
54-55, 77-90 (1972); D. PAC~: & J. STYLES, ORGANIZED CRIME, 26-35 (1975). 
41. J. D~:GK~:R, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 93 {1979). According to John 
Decker, "[a)lthough most of the anti-prostitution laws in effect in the United States are neutral on 
their face . . ., it is clear that the primary thrust of the offenses are against the activities of women." 
Id. The U.S. legal system of criminalizing prostitution is antithetical to the letter and spirit of the 
U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitu-
tion of Others, G.A. Res. 317(IV), U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 33 {1949), which called for the decriminal-
ization of prostitution. The resolution makes prostitution per se neither legal nor illegal. It removes 
scrutiny and punishment from the individual women without legitimizing prostitution as an institu-
tion. In other words, it merely tolerates prostitution, while criminalizing pimping and procuring. Cf 
PROSTITUTION CO!II!IIITfEE, supra note 5, at 13 (lack of "distinction • . . between a lover relation-
ship in which one person supports another by working as a prostitute ... makes it difficult for 
prostitutes to lead normal lives outside of their work, and does little to protect them from exploitation 
by abusive pimps"). Retaining their rights like other citizens, prostitutes would be subject only to the 
general scope of civil and business codes, and would be more able to leave prostitution, if they choose 
to, without being branded by social stigma or by a criminal record. By contrast, legalization would set 
the state up as pimp, and by requiring prostitutes to register, would brand them, making it harder for 
them to leave. For example, in several Nevada towns where prostitution is legalized, brothels are 
licensed by the state and prostitutes registered and fingerprinted. R. ToNG, supra note 35, at 57. 
Decriminalization, not legalization, is the system supported by both prostitutes and feminist groups. 
See PROSTITUTION CoMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 13-19; Macmillan, Prostitution as Sexual Politics, 
QuEST: A FEMINIST Q., Summer 1977, at 41; see also Jennings, supra note 5, at 1247-48 
{decriminalization would lessen dependence on pimp and would allow greater opportunities for prosti-
tutes to find other employment if they so choose), 1263-65 (disadvantages of legalization and govern-
ment licensing of houses of prostitution). 
42. NATIONAl. 0RG. FOR WoMEN (NOW), SAN FRANCISCO CHAPTER, PROSTITUTION: A FEM-
INIST IssuE 1 (n.d.) (pamphlet on file with author); see PROSTITUTION CoMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 
7-8 (law enforcement's disproportionate impact on gender and race). FBI Uniform Crime Reports 
indicate that 70.7% of arrests in 1976 for prostitution were women. In the same year, blacks com-
prised 52.4%, while whites accounted for 46% of those arrested. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 93; see 
also Haft, Hustling for Rights, CIV. LIBERTIES REv., Winter-Spring 1974, at 8, 14 (because many 
landlords and bar owners refuse to house black prostitutes, many are forced to become streetwalkers 
where they are most vulnerable to arrest). Although 69% of the adult male population have visited a 
prostitute at least once, A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 
HUMAN MAU: 597 {1948), the number of customers arrested is far less than the number of prosti-
tutes. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 398; see also Jennings, supra note 5, at 1255 n.119 {testimony by 
vice squad officer revealed San Francisco Vice Detail policy of not arresting customers even when 
they admitted violation); Sciolino, Off the Street, Prostitution Is Flourishing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 
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tutes, "while politicians ignore the structure of commercialized vice which 
sustains them."43 Raids and crackdowns continue to strike at prostitutes, 
especially streetwalkers, but political, financial, and real estate interests in 
prostitution remain essentially untouched.44 
Police arrests are often made simply to keep prostitutes off the street, or 
to harass them enough to make them leave the area.45 Such crackdowns 
only reinforce a woman's dependence on her pimp, upon whom she must 
now rely to provide bail.46 Once the pimp has paid the bail or fines, the 
woman is released into his custody. The pimp may then force her into 
more acts of prostitution to satisfy her debt to him. Thus, the system it-
self-the criminalization of prostitution, discriminatory enforcement of the 
penal code, habitual harassment of prostitutes by repeated arrests and 
fines-keeps women trapped in a system of debt bondage.47 
II. CIVIL RICO: A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil RIC048 allows a private cause of action49 for anyone injured by the 
investment in, acquisition or operation of an "enterprise" that affects in-
1984, at B1, col. 1 (Captain Jerome Piazza, commanding officer of Public Morals Division for south-
ern half of Manhattan, explaining why customers went free although call girls were arrested after 
police raid on New York City escort service: "You can ruin a lot of marriages by making a 'john' 
collar."). Studies show that the typical patron of prostitutes is a middle-aged, middle-class married 
man. j. jAMES, j. WITHERS, M. HAFT & S. THEISS, THE PoLITICS OF PROSTITUTION 52 (1976); 
M. STEIN, LOVERS, FRIENDS, SLAVES 95-96 (1975); James & Burstin, Prostitution in Seattle, 25 
WAsH. ST. B. NEWS 5, 28 (1971). When the laws are targeted only at prostitutes and not customers, 
or when law enforcement officials only enforce facially neutral laws against women, R. ToNG, supra 
note 35, at 55, the demand for prostitution is allowed to remain essentially unchanged. 
43. G. SH~:~:HY, supra note 3, at II. 
44. Jd. at 11-13. 
45. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 102; see also id. at 109-10 (enormous costs of processing police 
arrests}; PROSTITUTION CoMMITTEE, supra note 5, at 11 (in 1977, cost of arresting and keeping one 
prostitute in jail for two weeks in New York was $3,000, while minimal amount spent to help those 
wanting to change jobs); Jennings, supra note 5, at 1256, 1258 (myriad costs involved in arresting, 
processing and prosecuting prostitutes). Most police actions and crackdowns are motivated by political 
and community pressure. J. DECKER, supra note 41, at 109; D. PACE & J. STYLES, supra note 40, at 
132; G. SHEEHY, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
46. C. WINICK & P. KINSIE, THE LIVELY COMMERCE 109 (1973); PROSTITUTION COMMITTEE, 
supra note 5, at 8 (arrests result in dependence on pimps and, by causing many prostitutes to move to 
other cites, increase their sense of isolation); Haft, supra note 42, at 15 (constant arrests and fines 
lock women into prostitution both by forcing them to rely on pimps for bail and by creating criminal 
records that make it difficult to find other work); Jennings, supra note 5, at 1246-47 (pimps "provide 
bail and obtain legal services in the event a prostitute is arrested"}. 
47. 20120, supra note 19, at 6 (according to Cleveland police intelligence report, woman "is 
placed in a white slavery or indentured servant ring, in which she works off the money fronted by the 
organization"); see also D. PACE & C. STYLES, supra note 40, at 137 (although some women initially 
intended their involvement in prostitution to be temporary, "once in the business and under the aus-
tere direction of a pimp, it is difficult for them to return to the work-a-day world"); R. RosEN, supra 
note 1, at 172 ("[f]ear of violence frequently makes escape impossible or unimaginable for many 
contemporary prostitutes"). "These girls in massage parlors are mostly young girls. There is an ele-
ment of fear involved, and they're in a foreign country. So once they get here, they're more or less 
stuck." Russo Interview, supra note 20. 
48. Civil RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) is part of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 
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terstate or foreign commerce through a "pattern of racketeering activity" 
occurring within a ten year period.110 Racketeering activity is defined as 
the violation of state and federal offenses listed in the RICO statute, in-
cluding the offense of trafficking in women.111 The driving force behind 
the provision is to harness private interests to accomplish what the state 
does not have the resources to do. Civil RICO, in essence, empowers pri-
vate prosecutors. 
This section shows how the nature and organization of prostitution 
rings fit the statutory requirements needed to invoke civil RICO. It argues 
that because injury to "business or property"112 should encompass the sort 
of injury incurred by prostitutes, the injury requirement needed for civil 
RICO standing113 should be satisfied, thereby giving prostitutes a private 
right of action against the prostitution enterprise. 
& Supp. III 1985). RICO was enacted in response to the increasing strength and growth of organized 
crime. See PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIM•: IN A FREE SociETY 188 (1967) ("organized crime has been expanding despite the 
Nation's best efforts to prevent it"). As traditional criminal statutes had failed to curb organized 
criminal activities, RICO was passed "to enable the Federal Government to address a large and 
seemingly neglected problem." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981). To accomplish 
this, Congress authorized private civil actions against RICO violators. See 1976 TASK FoRCE, supra 
note 29, at 103 (civil sanctions seen as useful approaches to fighting organized crime). 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). Some private individuals forced into prostitution have shown 
interest in suing their procurers, as in the case of two women promised show-business jobs in Japan 
and then pressured into prostitution. The women said they tried to get help from the U.S. Embassy 
but that "'the officers of the Foreign Service refused to render any ... aid or assistance.' " The suit 
named the Japanese agents and their aides as well as then Secretary of State Alexander Haig as 
defendants. Shearer, Vice Ring, Wash. Post, June 13, 1982 (Parade Magazine), at 15, col. 1. 
50. 18 U.S.C. §1962(a)-(d) (1982); 18 U.S.C § 1961(5) (1982). 
51. White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1982)). The term "white slavery" was first used to distinguish the problem 
from 19th-century black slavery, but racial and class prejudice soon lead to the portrayal of a "white 
slave" to include only innocent white women. K. BARRY, supra note 1, at 27; R. RosEN, supra note 
1, at 62. See generally supra note 1. This Note rejects the term and uses "traffic in women," "sex 
slave trade," or "Mann Act" instead. 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
53. This Note argues that women injured by prostitution enterprises can sue under the injury to 
"business or property" provision of section 1964(c). See infra text accompanying notes 79-106. Al-
though suing criminal enterprises can be daunting, private plaintiffs can receive legal assistance and 
other resources from groups ranging from prostitutes' rights organizations, such as COYOTE (Call 
Off Your Old Tired Ethics), to advocacy groups such as NOW (National Organization for Women). 
The gamut of organized crime is wide, ranging from organized criminal activities conducted by 
groups of individuals to mob-type organized crime such as the Mafia. Private individuals who sue the 
latter are likely to encounter significant hurdles. Aside from obvious fear of retaliation and the ex-
treme disparity in power and wealth between plaintiff and defendant, such suits are also difficult to 
execute. See Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 237, 260 n.59 (1982) (Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel of Senate Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 1969-1970, when Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 910452, 84 Stat. 941, was considered.). The difficulty lies in determining and locating 
the defendant's assets, getting to the assets if they are held under a third party's name or controlled by 
corporate shells, and preventing the assets from being dissipated prior to seizure. See Blakey, supra, 
for a discussion of government reports and findings examining this problem. However, the Mafia and 
other underworld-type organizations are not the only groups targeted by RICO. In fact, RICO 
neither equates nor identifies "organized crime" with the Mafia alone. See generally 1986 REPORT, 
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A. Harsh Penalties 
To encourage private civil action, the Act provides great monetary incen-
tives for successful plaintiffs by granting them recovery of treble damages, 
court costs, and attorney's fees.114 Congress clearly realized not only the 
need to deal with individuals involved in criminal enterprises, but also the 
value of attacking "the economic base through which those individuals 
constitute such a serious threat .... "~5 Large monetary awards serve 
both to provide incentives for private plaintiffs and to divest organized 
crime of its financial base. 
To ensure that private plaintiffs have expansive avenues to institute 
RICO suits, Congress granted broad procedural rules regarding venue 
and process. 56 It authorized the courts to serve summons on and join par-
ties residing in other districts, if justice so requires. Thus private plaintiffs 
can cause any defendant, even one with international prostitution net-
works, to be sued if the defendant h;is the specified jurisdictional link to 
the U.S. 
B. Elements of Civil RICO 
To have a private cause of action, a plaintiff must prove the existence of 
certain RICO elements. She must show that she has been injured from the 
operation of an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce and 
conducted via acts constituting a "pattern of racketeering." 
supra note 40, at 23. Senator McClellan, the sponsor of RICO, said that "in none of the hearings or 
in the processing of legislation in which I have been involved has the term been used in this circum-
scribed fashion." Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Ba-
sic Concepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013 n.15 (1980) (quoting GAM-
BLING IN AMERICA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE REVIEW OF NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD 
GAMBLING 181-82 (1976)). Thus, under civil RICO, private plaintiffs can sue any organized crimi-
nal activities conducted through an enterprise and sufficiently related to constitute a pattern. 
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
55. S. Rt:P. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969} (Report of Sen. McClellan}. Civil remedies 
are "concerned with prevention and restitution, not with incarceration." Gardner, Increasing the Ef 
fectiveness of the Criminal Prosecutor Through Creative Use of the Civil Courts, 10 PROSECUTOR 
293, 295 {1974). Thus these remedies are particularly .effective in attacking the financial bases of 
organized crime. "Organized crime is an economic phenomenon. It exists not for honor, not for mys-
tique of the secret society, not for anything else but profit .... [T)he solution to organized crime in 
the broadest terms is simply to eliminate the profit." NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., THE UsE 
OF CIVIL REMEDIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL 5 (rev. ed. 1977) {citation omitted). A similar 
assessment appears in the U.N.'s Special Rapporteur's comments on the business of traffic in women: 
"Many violations of human rights [are) committed under the pretense of political excuse, civil war, 
subversion, national security, disloyalty to the state ... ; here is no political motive at all. The motive 
is profit." Radio U.N., supra note 12, at 2. 
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)-(d} (1982) ("Any civil action ... may be instituted in the district court 
of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts 
his affairs."). 
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1. Organization: The Enterprise 
Statutorily defined, "enterprise" can be an "individual," a "legal en-
tity," or a "group of individuals associated in fact."57 This definition is 
interpreted to mean an "ongoing" and "continuing unit" of "persons asso-
ciated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of con-
duct."58 It must have a "financial purpose"59 and must be more than a 
loose group created only to commit the racketeering activity. In other 
words, the enterprise must be "a separate and discrete element of a RICO 
violation. "60 
Where traffic rings are closely coordinated and organized, where they 
are involved in an ongoing process of procurement for prostitution, and 
where they have sound financial bases, they clearly satisfy the enterprise 
element required by RIC0.61 In addition, because the term "enterprise" 
may comprise both legitimate and illegitimate organizations,62 prostitution 
rings organized for solely illegitimate purposes-without infiltrating or 
investing in legitimate businesses-would still qualify as RICO 
enterprises. 
2. Pattern of Racketeering 
To prove a "pattern of racketeering activity," a plaintiff must show that 
the defendant has, within the last ten years, committed two violations of a 
number of acts listed in the RICO statute.63 Known as "predicate acts," 
these include a number of state and federal offenses, such as kidnapping, 
mail and wire fraud, and interstate transportation of women for 
prostitution. 
57. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(4) (1982). 
58. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). The enterprise is not simply the "pat-
tern of racketeering" but rather must be a unit whose existence goes beyond that needed to commit the 
predicate acts. In other words, the " 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity,' " although 
"the proof used to establish these separate elements may in particular cases coalesce .... " Id. In 
direct opposition to the views of the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit 
holds that the enterprise must also "have an existence that is independent, self-contained, separate and 
distinct" from the pattern of racketeering. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1371-72 (8th 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); see also United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 
1198-1201 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983). For a critique of the Eighth Circuit's 
holdings, see Blakey, supra note 53, at 299 n.165. 
59. United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 58-65 (2d Cir. 1983) (commission of predicate acts for 
political or other non-economic purpose not within RICO). 
60. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 
(1982). 
61. See supra notes 6-7, 26-28, and accompanying text (organized structure of prositution rings). 
Racketeering acts described in Section I are committed through an organized and structured enterprise 
that exists apart from the racketeering activities at issue. 
62. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81; see United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (enterprise does not have to be legitimate business infiltrated by organized crime; prostitu-
tion rings engaged at onset in illegitimate activities are also RICO enterprises). 
63. 18 u.s.c. §§ 1961(1), (5) (1982). 
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Kidnapping applies whenever a woman is abducted. 64 Mail and wire 
fraud pertain whenever the mails or wires are used in "any scheme or 
artifice to defraud" through "false or fraudulent pretenses."611 False pre-
tenses regarding a present or past fact as well as regarding a point in the 
future are deemed mail or wire fraud if transmitted accordingly.66 Thus, 
for instance, a fraudulent promise of a legitimate entertainment job made 
via mail or wire in order to lure a woman into prostitution would consti-
tute a violation of the mail or wire fraud statute. Under the Mann Act, a 
violation occurs when a person "transports in interstate or foreign com-
merce . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution. "67 Prostitu-
tion rings that transport women into the U.S. from foreign countries as 
well as those that transport women across states within the U.S. are vio-
lating the Mann Act. 68 
Because RICO is not aimed at sporadic, individual violators, the predi-
64. See White Slavery Ring Indictments in Wis., Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 18, 1972, at 20, col. I 
(ring kidnapping women from bars and forcing them into prostitution); see also supra note 8. 
RICO prohibits a wide array of criminal activities. Section 196t(t)(A) designates eight state law 
felonies ("any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, 
or dealing in ... dangerous drugs"), and §§ 1961(1)(B) and (C) include a list of federal criminal 
statutes encompassing acts indictable under various sections of U.S.C. titles 18 and 29. The RICO 
statute "does not make criminal conduct that before its enactment was not already prohibited . . . ." 
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1021 n.71. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Violation of this statute constitutes a predicate act under§ 1961(1) 
of RICO. 
66. The Supreme Court emphasized as early as 1896 the breadth of the mail fraud statute. See 
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 314 (1896) ("It was with the purpose of protecting the 
public against all such intentional efforts to despoil, and to prevent the post office from being used to 
carry them into effect, that this statute was passed; and it would strip it of value to confine it to such 
cases as disclose an actual misrepresentation as to some existing fact, and exclude those in which is 
only the allurement of a specious and glittering promise."). 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1982); see 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1982) ("Whoever ... entices or coerces any 
woman or girl to go from one place to another in interstate or foreign commerce . . . for the purpose 
of prostitution . . . whether with or without her consent . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned 
.... "(emphasis added)); see also Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119 (1932) (Mann Act 
covers "cases in which the woman consents to her own transportation"); United States v. Pelton, 578 
F.2d 701, 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1978) (consent of woman to be transported is no 
defense). Neither is it a defense that the woman transported is, has been, or plans to be engaged in 
prostitution. Hattaway v. United States, 399 F.2d 431, 433 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); McGuire v. 
United States, 152 F.2d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 1945). This Note takes the position that consent is mean-
ingless in this context not because women do not have the capacity to consent or make rational deci-
sions, but because "free choice" is easily distorted given the extreme disparity in bargaining power 
between the parties. Cf. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
774-86 (1983); id. at 774-75 ("[P)aternalistic restrictions in our law of contracts ... [are] intended 
to prevent an individual from contracting away too large a part of his personal liberty. The most 
obvious and elementary restriction of this sort is the prohibition against contracts of peonage or self-
enslavement."). 
68. In proving a predicate act, such as the Mann Act, a civil RICO plaintiff has an enormous 
advantage over public prosecutors: She need prove those acts only by a preponderance of evidence. 
Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3282-83 (1985); Blakey, supra note 53, at 259-60 
n.59 (preponderance standard). Thus, for example, in cases where U.S. agents who book women for 
entertainment in Japan plead ignorance of the situation there, supra note 32 and accompanying text, 
the burden of proving their intention to procure is more easily satisfied under civil RICO by a private 
plaintiff than under a criminal action by federal prosecutors. 
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cate acts are required to be part of a "pattern of racketeering activity." 
Courts have disagreed on the nexus needed among predicate acts to estab-
lish a pattern.69 However, all courts require that the predicate acts be 
related to the enterprise's affairs.70 Thus, while the enterprise is an entity 
separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity, there must be 
a nexus between them in that the enterprise must be affected by, or con-
ducted via acts constituting a pattern of racketeering.71 Kidnapping, mail 
or wire fraud, and the interstate transportation of women for prostitution 
are conducted through organized prostitution enterprises and would 
amount to a "pattern of racketeering activity" connected to the affairs of 
the criminal enterprise. 
C. Injury 
A civil RICO plaintiff no longer needs to prove "competitive in-
jury"72 (an indirect injury suffered as a competitor) or "racketeering in-
69. Some courts have held that, to constitute a pattern, the predicate acts must be related to each 
other by some common scheme, plan, or motive and cannot be simply a series of disconnected acts. For 
a list of such cases, see Project, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 173, 355 & n.1429. Other courts reject this requirement and instead hold that the predicate acts 
need not be related to each other, as long as they are related to the enterprise's affairs. See id. at 355 
& n.1434. 
70. 18 U.S.C. §1962(b) makes it "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering 
activity ... to acquire or maintain ... any interest in or control of any enterprise .... " (emphasis 
added). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) prohibits conducting or participating in an "enterprise's affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity." (emphasis added). See, e.g., United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 54 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied., 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1121-23 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 & n.23 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied., 439 U.S. 953 (1978); see also Fitzpatrick, Elements of a RICO Action After 
Sedima, in LITIGATION AND ADMIN. PRAC. SERIES, No. 139, CIVIL RICO 31-35 {1985) (hereinafter 
CiVIL RICO) (discussion of requirement that enterprise must be affected by or conducted via pattern 
of racketeering); O'Neill, The Elements of a Private Civil Action Under the RICO Statute After 
Sedima, in CiVIL RICO, id. at 55-63 (analysis of requisite connection and degree of relationship 
between enterprise and pattern of racketeering activities). 
71. As long as the enterprise is an "ongoing organization" or a "continuing unit," United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981), some courts hold that even "different or unrelated crimes" can be 
admitted as proof of "pattern" because they were perpetrated through and related to the affairs of the 
enterprise. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1136 (1982); see United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23. 
72. Because civil RICO's treble damage provision was modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), many lower courts, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, 105 S. 
Ct. 3275, had held that only those injured indirectly as competitors rather than those injured directly 
by the commission of the predicate acts had RICO standing. For a list of decisions requiring a com-
petitive injury, see Sedima, 741 F.2d 482, 493 n.33 (2d Cir. 1984). The dissent in Sedima illustrates 
the rejected competitive injury requirement: If a racketeer used arson and assault to force competitors 
out of business and acquire their shares of the market, arson and assault constituted the predicate acts. 
Those competitors forced out of business could recover under civil RICO. However, those who suf-
fered direct damages from the the predicate acts could not recover, for example, for the cost of the 
building or for personal injury. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Contra 
Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101, 
1109-13 (1982) and Blakey, supra note 53, at 255-56 & nn.52-53, 261 n.63, 263 n.72 (legislative 
history shows rejection of antitrust competitive injury for RICO purposes). Strict requirements for 
antitrust plaintiffs for "standing to sue" are appropriate because to ruin an antitrust defendant by 
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jury"73 (an injury from the pattern of racketeering rather than simply 
from the predicate acts). Under the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., '"racketeering activity' consists of no more and no 
less than commission of a predicate act."74 Thus the "compensable injury 
. . . is the harm caused by the predicate acts sufficiently related to consti-
tute a pattern .... "711 
This interpretation is extremely important for bringing victims of pros-
titution rings within the general ambit of civil RICO. Before Sedima re-
solved the controversy among the circuits regarding the necessity of prov-
ing "competitive" or "racketeering enterprise" injury,76 it was unclear 
whether or not women injured by a Mann Act violation could even invoke 
civil RICO. The injury suffered by them would have been unlikely to fit 
the "racketeering" or "competitive" injury envisioned by certain circuits. 
With the Court's decision in Sedima, however, injury resulting directly 
from the predicate acts is sufficient to invoke RIC0,77 provided all other 
RICO elements are met. Since a violation of the Mann Act is a predicate 
act,78 a showing of injury stemming from such violation would qualify as 
the sort of injury now recognized by RICO. 
One significant barrier remains. Although Sedima now allows recovery 
for injury from the predicate acts themselves, in the case of the Mann Act, 
the section 1964(c) requirement of injury to "business or property" is one 
of the elements that must be met before a victim can have a private right 
of action against the prostitution ring. This Note argues that, given the 
underlying purposes of RICO, the traditional concept of "property" m-
jury should be expanded to allow for such an action. 
opening the door to frivolous suits would be antithetical to the purpose of the statute and would 
further reduce competition. RICO, by contrast, should not be similarly restricted because its purpose 
is to eradicate organized criminal activities. 
73. Prior to Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, the "racketeering injury" requirement was adhered to by 
many courts. See Comment, Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering Enterprise Injury Re-
quirement, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 364, 368 n.28 (1985) (list of courts requiring and list rejecting "rack-
eteering" injury). Even those courts requiring such an injury failed precisely to define it. !d. at 
372-74. In practice, this requirement meant that a plaintiff victimized by acts of arson was unable to 
recover immediately; instead the plaintiff had to wait until his or her property was damaged again in 
another fire, show that because of his or her past record, he or she was denied fire insurance and 
would not get reimbursed for damages from the new fire. This monetary loss would then qualify as 
injury due to the "pattern" and would therefore be recoverable. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 
F.2d 511, 517 (2d Cir. 1984). 
74. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285. 
75. !d. at 3286. 
76. This requirement would have precluded recovery for violation of certain predicate acts listed 
in section 1961(1). See Blakey, supra note 53, at 257 & n.57 (civil RICO action would be precluded 
where union fund is looted, because hardly possible to show competitive injury); id. at 258 & n.58 (no 
civil RICO action where government agencies are corrupted by organized crime because government 
hardly capable of being hurt competitively). Similarly, one would not speak of a woman injured by 
prostitution enterprises as having suffered competitive injury. 
77. 105 S. Ct. 3285-86. 
78. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(1) (1982). 
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D. Proposal To Expand the Scope of "Property Injury" 
Injury to a victim's person or body should satisfy the standing require-
ment of injury to "property" as called for under section 1964(c).79 Within 
this limited setting, the victim's body should be understood as property. 
The first part of this section shows why this proposal does not contravene, 
but indeed accords with, congressional purpose. The second part sets forth 
the proposal itself. The last part contemplates questions of damages and 
explores how they might be calculated. 
1. Legislative History 
The legislative history of RICO reveals nothing that would forbid this 
interpretation. Congress was primarily concerned with the growth of or-
ganized crime.80 The Act's Statement of Findings and Purpose clearly 
states that RICO is intended to "seek the eradication of organized crime 
. . . by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced 
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful "'ctivities of those 
engaged in organized crime. "81 Statements by members of Congress reflect 
similar concern over the general threat posed by organized {:rime, 82 as 
well as its infiltration into legitimate businesses.83 Because prostitution 
rings and their traffic networks are operated and controlled by organized 
criminal elements,84 often hiding behind a facade of legitimate enter-
prise,85 they lie precisely within the core of congressional concern. Al-
lowing private civil actions to supplement limited government resources86 
79. A private plaintiff must be able to show injury to "property" or "business" before a private 
cause of action is granted. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 
80. See, e.g., 115 CoNG. REC. 5872 (1969) (review by Sen. :ryl,cClellan on development of organ-
ized crime in U.S. and on failure of traditional laws to stop its growth); Measures Relating to Organ-
iud Crime: Hearings on S. 30, S. 974, S. 975, S. 976, S. 1623, S. 1624, S. 1861, S. 2022, S. 
2122, and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Comm. on the 
judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 107-55 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings .on S. 30); see also Blakey, 
supra note 53, at 249-80 (extensive discussion of legislative history of RICO); Strafer, Massumi & 
Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling;" 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655, 681 
n.195 (1982) (remarks of members of Congress regarding dangers of organized crime and need to 
eradicate organized criminal activities). 
81. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970) 
(emphasis added). 
82. Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80, at 700-01 & Iin.307-13. 
83. ld. at 687 nn.228-30. 
84. See supra Section I.B. and accompanying notes. 
85. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
86. "[E)xisting law, state and federal, ... was not adequate to address the problem, which was 
of national dimensions." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 (1981). Because "temporary, 
one-shot attacks" are not effective, "continuing pressure" must be exerted against organized crime. 
AGVA Hearings, supra note 12, at 316, 325 (statement of Thomas Maxwell, former Assistant State 
Attorney, Baltimore City). Furthermore, law enforcement agencies may not be as organized and well-
coordinated as organized crime, id. at 136 (statement of William J. Scott, former Special Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, Northern District of Illinois); these agencies also are faced with personnel shortages, 
id. at 72-73 (testimony of Frank Rizzo, Philadelphia Police Department Inspector). 
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would thus further the Congressional purpose of attacking criminal activi-
ties "on all available fronts."87 
Furthermore, Congress was concerned not just with organized crime 
and its infiltration into businesses, but also with the underlying racketeer-
ing acts. 88 Because the Mann Act is listed as a racketeering act, activities 
associated with it-prostitution rings engaged in the traffic of women, for 
example-are precisely the sort of activities Congress sought to eradicate. 
Private causes of action would further this goal. 
To effectuate RICO's purpose in fighting organized crime and related 
racketeering activities, Congress specifically wrote in a directive not found 
in any other federal law that imposes criminal penalties:89 "[T]he provi-
sions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-
poses."90 In addition, the sponsors of RICO envisioned its creative use: 
"The bill is innovative .... Hopefully, experts on organized crime will 
be able to conceive of additional applications of the law. The potential is 
great."91 RICO is not "limit[ed] [to] the remedies ... already ... estab-
lished. The ability of our chancery courts to formulate a remedy to fit the 
wrong is one of the great benefits of our system of justice."92 It is precisely 
within this context that this Note's proposals should be examined. 
87. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969) (report of Sen. McClellan). 
88. "While RICO had as one of its purposes preventing the takeover of legitimate business by 
organized crime, it is myopic to read RICO as if that were its only purpose. RICO was also aimed at 
racketeering." Blakey, supra note 53, at 254 n.49. In holding that RICO should be applied to wholly 
illegitimate activities and enterprises as well as to legitimate businesses infiltrated by organized crime, 
the Court stated that such application would "deal with the problem at its very source." United States 
v. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591. The Court further said that "the infiltration of legitimate businesses was 
of great concern, but the means provided to prevent that infiltration plainly included striking at the 
source of the problem." I d. at 592-93 (emphasis added). In other words, the Court suggested that 
RICO is applicable against illegal activities themselves and is not limited only to the infiltration of 
legitimate business. Id. at 590. It follows then that RICO "is not limited to investment in or takeover 
of legitimate businesses, but extends to the operation of 'enterprises,' . . . by 'racketeering acts 
.... '" Blakey, supra, at 258 n.59. Both eradicating racketeering or predicate acts and preventing 
the operation of an enterprise by racketeering are goals envisioned by Congress in enacting RICO. 
Because the Mann Act is expressly listed as a racketeering act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), breaking up 
prostitution enterprises used to traffic women would legitimately fall under RICO. See, e.g., United 
States v. Martino, 681 F.2d 952, 958 (5th Cir. 1982), affd sub nom. Russello v. United States, 464 
U.S. 16 (1983) ("Narcotics trafficking, loan sharking, insurance fraud, extortion, gambling, and pros-
titution-all crimes in which the proceeds primarily consist of money-were all objects of congres-
sional concern." (footnotes omitted)); United States v. Thompson, 669 F.2d 1143, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 
1982) (court refusing to allow RICO to be used "against every instance of venality,'' and citing with 
approval use of RICO against prostitution ring protected by bribed prosecutor); cf. United States v. 
I vic, 700 F.2d 51, 61 (2d. Cir. 1983) (court refusing to consider activities of terrorist groups as racke-
teering acts, stating that they are "worlds removed from that of such venal organizations as gambling, 
narcotics, or prostitution rings"). 
89. Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 167, 168 n.6 (1980). 
90. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947. 
91. 115 CoNG. REC. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska). Senator Hruska was a principal 
sponsor of RICO and was involved from its inception to its final acceptance into law. See, e.g., 113 
CoNG. REc. 17,997-18,002 (1967). For a discussion of Senator Hruska's role in the legislative pro-
cess, see Blakey, supra note 53, at 253-56, 258-65. 
92. 115 CoNG. REC. 9567 (statement of Sen. McClellan). Representative Poff, another sponsor of 
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2. Body as Property 
Prostitution enterprises control and use prostitutes' bodies as vehicles for 
conducting their illegal business. The victims' bodies are, in essence, 
treated as property to generate profit for the enterprise.93 If the injury is 
perpetrated on the premise that the victims' bodies are "property," the 
law should recognize this fact and address the violation rather than pre-
tend that it does not exist. For this purpose, courts should not be reticent 
to acknowledge body as a form of property94 and should allow women to 
show injury in their "property" in order to invoke section 1964(c) of 
RICO against prostitution rings. Prostitution enterprises, which have con-
sidered the prostitutes' bodies to be their property all along, should not be 
allowed to switch horses midstream just because the equation no longer 
serves their purpose. Moreover, the idea of conceptualizing one's body as 
a form of property is in no way far-fetched. Courts, politicians, and phi-
losophers have at one time or another drawn this parallel. 95 Courts should 
RICO, also noted that the bill would "not only sharpen old tools but forge new tools of law enforce-
ment" as well. 113 CoNG. REc. 17,947 (1967). Statements of sponsors are normally given great 
weight by courts. S&E Contractors v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 {1972) ("In construing laws 
we have been extremely wary of . . . debates on the floor of Congress save for precise analyses of 
statutory phrases by the sponsors of the proposed laws.") {citations omitted). Though RICO has been 
applied more in cases involving business and commercial frauds, Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 
S. Ct. 3275, at 3287 n.16 (1985), its application should not be cabined by the reasoning used in those 
very different settings. In fact, a Senate Committee Report commenting on section 1964, S. REP. No. 
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1970), noted that "(a]lthough certain remedies are set out, the list is 
not exhaustive, and the only limit on remedies is that they accomplish the aim set out of removing the 
corrupting influence and make due provision for the rights of innocent persons." Blakey, supra note 
53, at 266 n.87; see also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1042 {antitrust law is concerned with 
competition, while RICO is "more concerned with compensating victims and making them whole"). A 
creative interpretation designed to grant private rights of action to victims of prostitution enterprises is 
thus within the ambit of RICO. 
93. Where the pimp buys and sells the prostitute and uses her body to make a profit, he is clearly 
considering her to be his property. See 1986 REPORT, supra note 40, at 59-60 ("[I]n some gangs, 
women are used to generate income through prostitution ..•. Some gangs regard women •.. as 
'club property,' ... (or) the 'property' of individual members."), 66 ("[The gang's] general treatment 
of ... women, who are typically regarded as gang property, borders on slavery."); see also supra 
notes 5, 8, 29, 35 and accompanying text. 
94. This Note suggests that there are compensable interests in many things, even one's bodies, 
which we prefer to consider inalienable and incommensurable. We set "price on things we desperately 
would like to treat as priceless." G. CALABRESI & P. BoBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 144 (1978). For 
example, we assert "that anyone for whom an implant will be successful will be allotted one," id. at 
154, in order to appear as though we are not "pricing lives." Id. Similarly, we are reluctant to price 
or to assign property values to our bodies which we rightly consider sacred and priceless. Yet, while 
we do not want to broadly see body as alienable property, we should not insist on consistency for 
consistency's sake and refuse, in cases such as these, to imply a property notion to bodies in order to 
provide relief precisely to those whose bodies have been treated as property. 
95. Dicta in slavery cases drew parallels between "property" and "person" or "body." The court 
in Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. {18 Pick.) 193 (1836), addressing the question of whether a 
slave owner can bring a slave into a free state and then later force the slave to leave the state, stated, 
"being contrary to the fundamental laws of this State, such general right of property cannot be exer-
cised or recognized here." Id. at 217. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), held 
that the Fifth Amendment guarantee, that no one shall be denied life, liberty, and property, meant 
that slave owners could not be deprived of their property. Similar analogies were drawn by both 
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conceptually acknowledge body as property, not to legitimize the analogy 
but to curb its abuse. This analogy, in fact, has come to be similarly rec-
ognized in family law cases as a derogatory one. 96 Legal recognition of 
this analogy for RICO purposes can provide leverage against those en-
gaged in such derogatory acts. Injury to a woman's body under the Mann 
Act should therefore be given legal definition as injury to property, 
thereby affording the woman standing to invoke civil RICO. 
3. Damages 
The issues surrounding civil RICO damages have largely been ignored, 
especially by courts.97 As in the area of antitrust law, measuring damage 
in the RICO context is. similarly susceptible to problems of uncertainty.98 
This section aims only to set a few parameters from which to analyze the 
sort of recovery available for prostitution victims. 
In measuring injury to a woman's body as property, damages such as 
lost wages or lost opportunities due to her involvement in prostitution en-
terprises should be considered. The claim would be that but for this in-
volvement, her property (body) could have been put to better use. This 
determination would naturally entail a case by case analysis with the out-
come depending on the specific fact situation of each case. For example, 
an entertainer injured by prostitution fronts, posing as theatrical agencies 
recruiting her for legitimate nightclub acts in Japan, should be able to 
recover under this loss of opportunities theory. Legitimate show business 
abolitionists and anti-abolitionists in the 1800's. Anti-abolitionists argued that Congress could not 
abolish slavery because the Union had been formed to protect life, liberty, and property-and slaves 
were property. J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 42 (1965). Abolitionists used the same equation 
to come up with a different conclusion: "Congress should immediately restore to every slave, the 
ownership of his own body, mind and soul .... The right of property, on the part of the master 
over the slave, should instantly cease." /d. at 46 (statement of abolitionist Henry B. Stanton). "[I)f 
justice adjudges the slave to be 'private property,' it adjudges him to be his own property, since the 
right to one's self is the first right ... . "/d. at 276 (abolitionist Theodore Dwight Weld). Both sides 
assumed that a body was property. Their only difference lay in the question of who owned that 
property. See also j. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CoN-
CERNING ToLERATION para. 27 U. Gough ed. 1946) (everyone "has a property in his person; this 
nobody has any right to but himselr'). This Note, of course, asserts that the prostitute's body is her 
own property. 
96. See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48, 52 (1974) ("Neither 
parent's interests with regard to his or her children are a property right •... "); Doe v. Doe, 163 
Conn. 340, 307 A.2d 166, 168 (1972); In re Ladewig, 34 Ill. App. 3d. 393, 398, 340 N.E.2d 150, 154 
(1975). 
97. Parnon, RICO Damages: Look to the Clayton Act, Not the Predicate Act, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 
348, 348 & nn.2-5 (1985). 
98. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 53, at 260 n.59 ("as in the antitrust area, while proof of cause 
and the fact of damage ought to have to be made out, how a plaintiff meets its burden of proof as to 
the amount of damage ought to be ameliorated considerably") (referring to cases where Supreme 
Court has recognized that damage issues rarely can be measured with concrete exactness). 
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jobs that she could have pursued and which could have been available to 
her were lost. 99 
Another way of measuring damages would involve "looking to the un-
derlying predicate acts and utilizing the most analogous civil measure of 
damages. moo The appropriate measure of damages would vary depending 
on the type of injury suffered, which would in turn depend on the predi-
cate acts at issue.101 The type of injury suffered would determine the type 
of remedies available, in some cases tort-like remedies, in others, contrac-
tual type recovery.102 Following this mode of analysis, the type of injury 
incurred from a Mann Act violation is likely to be some form of personal 
injury. Although this Note does not propose that recovery for personal 
injuries per se should be made available under civil RIC0,103 it does ar-
gue that an exception should be made in the limited context of forced 
prostitution. 
For several compelling reasons, personal injuries should be recognized 
in prostitution cases. Victims in many of these cases would be unable to 
recover for lost wages or opportunities, and it would be incongruous to 
deny them recovery altogether, when recovery would be granted to other 
Mann Act victims.104 Furthermore, Congress broadly defined the class of 
RICO plaintiffs to include victims of crimes ranging from fraud to sex 
slave traffic.105 Since Sedima has held that direct victims of the predicate 
acts can recover, it would be inconsistent that some victims in that class 
99. Similarly, commentators have suggested that loss of wages resulting from unjust jail time 
would count as "business or property" injury. See, e.g., Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80, 
at 664. However, this measurement may not be applicable to other factual scenarios, for example, to 
cases involving Third World women brought to work in U.S. massage parlors, since the economic 
opportunities available to them in their native countries may be less than what they have in the U.S. 
A calculation of damages focused on lost wages may not be possible. 
100. Parnon, supra note 97, at 348 (citing Gorelick, The Measure of Damages of RICO Actions, 
in RICO: THE SECOND STAGE (ABA ed. Oct. 1984)). 
101. /d. at 348-49. 
102. /d. Parnon advocates a diametrically opposed approach, although his article is based on the 
pre-Sedima definition of injury. Parnon, supra note 97. Parnon would examine damage measure-
ments by "a narrower standard based on Section Four of the Clayton Act. This standard would 
exclude damages based on contractual 'expectation interests,' damages for personal injuries, and dam-
ages based on restitution or disgorgement, as well as other types of damages." /d. at 349. Further-
more, proof of "racketeering enterprise injury" required at the pleading stage by many courts before 
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 1075, would be extended to the damages stage as well. The plaintiff would have to 
show damages caused by a clear "racketeering injury" and would not recover for damages caused by 
the predicate acts./d. at 349 & n.14, 350. By contrast, responding to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Sedima, which struck down the racketeering injury requirement, 105 S. Ct., at 3285-86, this Note 
proposes that I) a plaintiff need only show injury sustained by the commission of the predicate acts, 2) 
the plaintiff be allowed to recover for this injury, and 3) damage measurements be based on the 
underlying predicate acts whose commission first caused the injury. 
103. Courts have traditionally held that civil RICO does not grant recovery for personal injuries. 
See Kaufman, RICO Remedies, in CIVIL RICO, supra note 70, at 154-55 (discussion of cases deny-
ing recovery for personal injury). 
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
105. 18 u.s.c. § 1961(1) (1982). 
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would be denied recovery because their injury does not neatly fit into the 
traditional concept of "property" injury.108 When a person is forced to 
prostitute herself, clearly the injury involves something beyond business/ 
property/commercial injury. Courts facing civil RICO claims should rec-
ognize that, unlike other predicate acts, those covered by the Mann Act 
threaten personal injury. Measuring damages for Mann Act violations 
should take this fact into consideration. 
Ill. REMAINING BARRIERS: POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENTS 
A. Pending Bills 
Sedima, over a strong dissent, held that a plaintiff need prove no injury 
beyond that caused directly by the predicate acts. The Court, in its deci-
sion, invited Congress to explicate any limits on the scope of civil 
RIC0.107 Congress is currently doing just that, although primarily out of 
concern that RICO is being used in ordinary business disputes to harass 
106. The courts should fashion an effective remedy for each of the RICO predicate acts desig-
nated by Congress. The Mann Act is listed in section 1961 (I) along with a wide range of other 
predicate acts. The fact that other predicate acts normally involve injury to traditional business, prop-
erty, or commercial type injuries, thus resulting in easier standing and damage calculations, does not 
mean that real and substantial injuries incurred from certain other predicate acts, the Mann Act, for 
example, can simply be wished away by denying recovery to Mann Act victims altogether. RICO 
should protect the rights of all victims of all predicate acts equally. In situations where a measurement 
of lost wages is not possible, see supra note 99, recoveries for personal injuries should be granted. The 
dissent in Sedima seems to have recognized this very concern: 
[M)any of the predicate acts listed in § 1961 threaten or inflict personal injuries .... If 
Congress in fact intended the victims of the predicate acts to recover for their injuries, as the 
Court holds it did, it is inexplicable why Congress would have limited recovery to business or 
property injury. It simply makes no sense to allow recovery by some, but not other victims of 
predicate acts . . . . 
105 S. Ct. at 3297 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
This Note argues that precisely because such discrepancy would not make "sense," damages from 
personal injury caused by commission of predicate acts that inherently threaten personal injury should 
be recoverable. This measurement of damages is consi.;tent with the proposal set forth in this Note. 
See supra Section II.D. Once courts accept the suggestion that body is "property" for civil RICO 
purposes, then damages to "property" in essence include bodily damages. Besides bodily injury and 
lost earnings, recovery can also be based on restitution theory, whereby proceeds from the prostitution 
enterprise are placed in trust funds for educational and training programs for prostitutes, or for 
projects to benefit shelters and covenant houses. The racketeering enterprise should not be allowed to 
keep its wrongful profit simply because there may be cases in which damages to the prostitute cannot 
be calculated. 
A proposal to allow a limited class of plaintiffs personally injured by the perpetration of certain 
predicate acts to sue has been suggested by Representative Clinger. H.R. 1704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1985). This bill to amend RICO would "authorize civil suits on behalf of victims of child pornogra-
phy and prostitution." The amendment would add 18 U.S.C. § 2251 or 2252, dealing with sexual 
exploitation of children, to the list of predicate acts currently included in RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
It would also amend § 1964(c) to explicitly allow anyone injured "personally" by a violation of § 
2251 or 2252 to sue. This Note also seeks to give a private right of action for plaintiffs injured by 
prostitution enterprises. It argues, however, that civil RICO, as it currently stands, should already 
allow for such suits. 
107. 105 S. Ct. at 3287. 
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legitimate businesses, who are thus forced to settle for fear of being la-
belled "racketeers."108 
Three bills to limit civil RICO are before Congress. One bill would 
limit private civil action to those suffering "competitive, investment or 
other business injury."~09 It would also limit the use of the more "trouble-
some" predicate acts by requiring that at least one of the predicate acts be 
something other than mail, wire, or securities fraud.110 Another bill would 
amend the same private plaintiff provision to require that a defendant be 
criminally convicted of a predicate act before the plaintiff can sue.m This 
bill has garnered the most support in Congress so far.112 The third bill 
would entail three major changes.113 It would delete "racketeering" from 
the title and all of the provisions of the statute; it would also require a 
prior indictment, as well as limit the use of predicate acts relating to the 
transportation of stolen goods, mail and wire fraud. 
B. Proposal for Balance: Change Without Vitiation 
As they stand, passage of any one proposed bill would unduly attenuate 
RICO's strength in combatting criminal activities, especially those con-
nected with prostitution enterprises. Any requirement of prior conviction 
or prior indictment would be problematic because it would defeat 
"[p]rivate attorney general provisions ... designed to fill prosecutorial 
gaps."114 The private right of action option was instituted because Con-
gress saw that enforcement agencies were weakened by "official timidity 
and inaction, or bribery and corruption."1111 Requiring prior government 
action would force plaintiffs to rely once again on government officials.116 
Limiting the class of civil plaintiffs to those able to show competitive 
injury would also unduly restrict RICO's scope. Harm directly caused by 
perpetration of proscribed acts would not be recoverable, whereas harm 
that is indirectly incurred would be.m Direct injury would not be com-
108. Time To Refonn RICO, The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 12, 1986, at 15, col. 1. 
109. S. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
110. Id. 
111. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
112. Bradley, Long Ann of the Rackets Law Draws Fire from White Collar Targets, The Chris-
tian Science Monitor, Feb. 7, 1986, at 21, col. 1. 
113. H.R. 2517, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
114. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284. 
115. Organized Crime Control: Hearings on S. 30 Before Subcomm. No.5 of the House Comm. 
on the judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi) [hereinafter House 
Hearings]. 
116. "(T]he compelled wait for the completion of criminal proceedings would result in pursuit of 
stale claims, complex statute of limitations problems, or the wasteful splitting of actions .... " 
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282 n.8. 
117. See supra note 72; see also the American Bar Association report, reprinted in 115 CoNG. 
REC 6994-95 (1969) which opposed grafting strict antitrust requirements onto RICO: 
[T]he use of antitrust laws themselves as a vehicle for combating organized crime could create 
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pensable, while indirect Injury to one's competitive position would be. 
This requirement could be tantamount to denying standing to victims of 
prostitution enterprises altogether.118 Given that the Mann Act is a predi-
cate act, it would be strange indeed if injury for this predicate act were 
not recoverable, but injury to other predicate acts-those which by their 
nature result in competitive injuries-would be. Similarly, limiting the 
class of defendants to those with "organized crime" connections only in 
order to exclude legitimate business would pose similar problems, making 
the act unenforceable if not unconstitutional.119 
While congressional concern over the harassment of legitimate busi-
nesses may be reasonable, it should not override civil RICO's primary 
purpose of fighting organized criminal activities and of providing a private 
right of action for victims.12° Congress passed the civil provisions because 
it believed them to have "greater potential than that of the penal sanc-
tions,"121 and to be "more promising."~22 One senator even saw the crimi-
nal sanctions as "an adjunct to the civil provisions."123 
To balance these two concerns of empowering victims of criminal activ-
ities and protecting legitimate businesses from harassment, this Note pro-
poses the following changes. Removing pejorative connotations by deleting 
the label "racketeer" would be a good start in accommodating business 
concerns. The fraud provisions could also be limited to curb overuse by 
making fraud alone no longer sufficient; one of the two predicate acts 
would need to be something other than mail, wire, or securities fraud. 
This should be done without resort to a prior conviction or prior indict-
ment requirement; although good for protecting businesses, this would be 
bad for fighting organized criminal activities. Some balance is needed, and 
to this end, Congress should not go beyond limiting the scope of those 
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured by organized crime who 
might seek treble damage recovery. Such a private litigant would have to contend with a body 
of precedent-appropriate in a purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on ques-
tions such as "standing to sue" and "proximate cause." 
Id. The ABA then recommended that "antitrust-type enforcement •.. (be] in a separate statute ... 
[to avoid] a commingling of criminal enforcement goals with the goals of regulating competition 
.... " Id. RICO was adopted as an independent statute and not as part of the Sherman Act. 
118. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text. 
119. See Blakey, supra note 53, at 276 & n.119; Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra note 80, at 
671-72. 
120. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 53, at 1042; see also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3280 ("those who 
have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given access to a legal remedy") (citing 
House Hearings, supra note 115, at 520) (statement of Rep. Steiger). 
121. Hearings on S. 30, supra note 80, at 408 (statement of Deputy Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst). 
122. See House Hearings, supra note 115, at 327 (statement of Association of N.Y.C. Bar). 
123. 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska) ("civil provisions [considered] the 
more important feature of the bill"). 
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provisions that most egregiously open up the floodgates for private RICO 
suits against legitimate businesses.124 
Another approach that may accommodate business concerns without 
overly burdening the fight against organized crime is one implicitly sug-
gested by the Court in Sedima. Justice White, in a footnote, 1211 suggests 
that a "pattern" as defined in section 1961(5) requiring two racketeering 
acts within ten years should be more stringently construed. A finding of 
"pattern" should reflect evidence of a common continuous scheme in the 
way the two acts relate, each undertaken in more than a single isolated 
criminal episode. 128 
Courts before Sedima did not strictly interpret the "pattern" require-
ment, 127 and instead scrutinized the now obsolete requirement of "compet-
itive" and/or "racketeering" injury. Proposals for a more narrow inter-
pretation of the "pattern" requirement have been put forth since the 
Sedima decision.128 Post-Sedima courts have also begun to place more em-
phasis on the "pattern" element.129 While this proposal can be said to be 
simply a concoction of the Court with no clear basis in RICO's legislative 
history130 and potentially subject to its own set of difficulties/31 it would 
not result in the same evisceration of civil RICO the way existing bills 
currently before Congress would. 
This restricted definition of "pattern," coupled with the proposed 
changes set forth in this Note, would leave intact the "private 
prosecutorial" powers envisioned in civil RICO and endorsed in Sedima. 
It would also leave intact Sedima's mandate to allow recovery to private 
plaintiffs injured by the commission of the predicate acts. At the same 
124. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 112, at 21 (businesses such as financial institutions, accounting 
firms, banks, securities firms, and other organizations such as AFL-CIO pushing for amendment of 
RICO; "less-monied groups" like Congress Watch, U.S. Public Interest Research Group opposing 
pending amendments). 
125. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14. 
126. /d. 
127. Chepiga, Bookin & Khuzami, The "Pattern of Racketeering Activity" Requirement After 
Sedima, in CIVIL RICO, supra note 70, at 76-77 {authors found only one case whereby RICO claim 
was dismissed because predicate aciS deemed not to constitute "pattern" of racketeering). 
128. Proposal for amending the current definition of the pattern requirement by the National 
District Attorneys Association and the National Association of Attorneys General set forth the follow-
ing: The two or more racketeering acts must be related to the enterprise, the acts must be related to 
each other, but at the same time not so closely connected as to constitute only a single transaction. /d. 
at 89-90. The Department of Justice also supports a stricter pattern requirement and suggests that 
the proposed amendment should not allow civil suiiS "based on a single criminal episode or transac-
tion with only one victim." /d. at 90. For a discussion of the American Bar Association recommenda-
tions, see id. at 93-94 (proposal focuses on relatedness and continuity requirements needed to estab-
lish pattern). 
129. /d. at 91-93 (discussion of lower cour!s' greater focus on the pattern requirement). 
130. /d. at 96-98 (no requirement that predicate acts be related to each other in legislative his-
tory; only requirement that predicate acts be related to enterprise). 
131. !d. at 98-101. 
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time, the proposal would still be sensitive to the concerns of legitimate 
business. It recognizes the need to close RICO's floodgate, only it proposes 
that attempts to restrict RICO's scope be steered in a different direction, 
and in a way which would preserve the utility of civil RICO in the fight 
against organized criminal activities. 
1322 
